With earthshaking and heartbreaking trends in African capital flight provided by a new database, this paper complements existing literature by answering some key policy questions on the feasibility of and timeframe for policy harmonization in the battle against the economic scourge. The goal of the paper is to study beta-convergence of capital flight across a set of 37 In other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified horizon is an indication that policies and regulations can be enforced without distinction of nationality or locality.
Introduction
A key constraint to African growth and development is the shortage of financing (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a) . The continent is facing substantial and growing financing gaps, hindering public investment and, poor social service delivery. Paradoxically, it is the source of large-scale capital flight 2 which has escalated during the last decade. According to the recent report by Boyce & Ndikumana, 33 $8,649 (second), $4,176 (5th), and $1,253 (15th) , respectively. They have massive oil reserves, ranking a recent bulk of 'African flight focused' theoretical and empirical studies, is the need for urgent policy action (ACAS, 2012) . Hence, in response, this paper is geared towards providing benchmarks for policy harmonization, with particular emphasis on the feasibility of and ideal timeframe for the harmonization process. Secondly, as far as we have searched, the absence of studies that have addressed the concern of policy harmonization represents an important missing link in the literature. This paper is an attempt to bridge this scholarly gap. Thirdly, the publication of a new database in October 2012 by Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a) provides a unique opportunity of assessing the phenomenon of capital flight that has not received the much needed scholarly attention owing to the absence of relevant data. More so, while providing for the possibility of more fine-tuned empirical analysis with updated policy implications, the richness of the dataset (in appealing time series properties) provides the much needed degrees of freedom essential for robust estimations. Fourthly, the study adapts to methodological insights from recent empirics of policy harmonization based on theoretical underpinnings of the convergence literature, which appear relevant in tackling some of the key questions in the battle against capital flight in developing countries. Hence, employment of the methodology also substantially contributes to the empirics of capital flight.
Cognizant of the above motivations, upholding blanket policies in the battle against capital fight may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental characteristics and prevailing trajectories of capital flight in the African continent. Hence, policy makers are most (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b) . Beside Boyce & Ndikumana (2012b) who provide excellent stylized facts on this scourge, the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS, 2012) Bulletin 87 on "Africa's Capital Losses: What Can Be Done?", has recently provided a plethora of perspectives on African capital flight (http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/issue87/) . 5 likely to ask the following questions before benchmarking policy harmonization. Is capital flight converging within Africa? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing of the convergence process?
While an answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies within identified fundamental characteristics of capital flight, the answer to the second will determine an optimal timeframe for the blanket policies. Accordingly, capital flight should converge from two main reasons: absolute convergence would occur in countries that share the same fundamental characteristics of capital flight (e.g, conflicts/political instability and petroleum exports) and; conditional convergence may occur if countries within the same fundamental characteristic of capital flight differ in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. The intuition underlying the linkage between capital flight and harmonization of policies within a homogenous panel is twofold; (1) convergence in the capital flight rate will imply that, the adoption of common policies to combat capital flight is feasible and; (2) full (100%) convergence will mean, the enforcements of these policies without distinction of nationality and locality. Countries need to harmonize policies with convergence in capital flight because; countries with low rates of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates. An indication that the capital flight problem is becoming worse in countries that formerly experienced less capital flight. This intuition is consistent with very recent methodological insights into intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization against software piracy (Asongu, 2012) .
The intuition motivating this paper is also in accordance with the evidence of income convergence across countries which has been investigated in the context of neoclassical growth models, originally developed by the pioneering works of Baumol (1986) , Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992 , 1995 and Mankiw et al. (1992) . The theoretical underpinnings of income convergence 6 are abundant in the empirical growth literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 ) and have recently been applied in other areas of economic development (Asongu, 2013b) . While there is a theory and vast empirical work on per capita income convergence, there is yet not a theory on convergence in other development branches e.g financial markets, IPRs, knowledge economy (KE)...etc. In facts, there is a growing importance of empirical convergence application to IPRs harmonization (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) , financial markets (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013a,b) , optimality of currency areas (Asongu, 2013c,d) and KE (Asongu, 2013e) . In light of these developments, aware of the risks of 'doing measurement without theory'; we argue that, reporting facts even without the presence of a formal theoretical model is a useful scientific activity. Hence, we concur with recent literature (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011) in the assertion that, applied econometrics has other tasks than merely validating or refuting economic theories.
As far as we have searched, the literature on African capital flight can be classified into four main strands: the importance of studying the phenomenon in African countries; causes of the scourge; pull factors and destination countries and; measurement of the phenomenon and policy orientation.
The first strand is largely borrowed from Boyce & Ndikumana (2011) . Accordingly, the problem of capital flight from African economies deserves serious attention for several reasons.
Firstly, most African countries have remained in the grip of a severe external debt crisis.
Consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana, in 2000 , debt service amounted to 3.8% of GDP for SSA countries. In comparative terms, the sub-region: was among the highest in literacy and infant mortality rates, spent 2.4% of GDP on health and only 55% of its citizens had access to clean drinking water (UNECA, 2007) . Hence, to the extent that the proceeds of external borrowing are 7 not used for the benefit of the African public (but rather to finance the accumulation of private external assets by the ruling elites), the moral and legal legitimacy of these debt-service
obligations remains an open debate. Secondly, capital flight constitutes a diversion of scarce resources away from domestic investment and productive activities. In recent decades, African governments have achieved significantly lower investment levels than other developing countries (Ndikumana, 2000) . Collier et al. (2001) estimate that if Africa were able to attract back the flight component of private wealth, domestic private capital stock would rise by about two-third. They also postulate that Africa's GDP per capita is 16% lower than it would be if the continent had been able to retain its private wealth at home. Fofack & Ndikumana (2009) Boyce & Ndikumana (1998 , both the acquisition and the transfer of funds often involve legally questionable practices, including the falsification of trade documents (trade misinvoicing), the embezzlement of export revenues and, kickbacks on public and private contracts. The negative effects of the resulting shortages of revenues and foreign exchange fall disproportionately on the less wealthy strata of society. The regressive effect of capital flight is further heightened when financial imbalances culminate in devaluation: a situation in which the wealthy that hold external assets are significantly insulated from the effects while the poor enjoy no such cushion. In accordance with the above, the main source of capital flight in African countries is the embezzlement public funds through corruption by officials in government.
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In the second strand, we are consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana (2011) in devoting space to highlight some causes of capital flight. Accordingly, we review the existing econometric evidence on the determinants of capital flight. Firstly, Boyce & Ndikumana (2003) have established external borrowing to be strongly correlated with capital flight. A position confirmed by Collier et al. (2004) . The pioneering work of Boyce (1992) (which distinguishes four possible causal links between capital flight and external debt) provides an excellent insight: debt-driven capital flight, debt-fueled capital flight, flight-driven external borrowing and flight-fueled capital flight. Secondly, capital flight tends to persists over time: everything being equal, past capital flight 'causes' more capital flight which is an indication of hysteresis in the dynamics of capital or the 'training effect' (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) . Thirdly, higher economic growth is associated with lower capital flight because of higher expected returns (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) . Fourthly, political risk is widely believed to play a significant role in the capital hemorrhage experienced by African countries (Collier et al., 2004) , though there are exceptions to this rule as illustrated by the case of the Congo (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998) . Fifthly, government quality (corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality and voice & accountability) has been identified as an important factor in capital flight.
With regard to pull factors and destination countries in the third strand, while it should be acknowledged that good capital flight may be invested in countries that promise good returns, most capital flight from Africa (which is the bad type for the most part) is deposited in Tax heavens where banking legislation is favorable to bank secrecy. Accordingly, the main pull factor from destination countries should be the possibility of opening secret bank accounts. In spite of the evocative images conjured by the term 'offshore', it would be wrong to think of tax havens and offshore financial centers (the cluster of banks, legal and other intermediary firms 9 that operate from these jurisdictions) as disconnected and remote from mainstream nation states (Christensen, 2009) . Hence, while geographically, many tax havens are located on small island economies dispersed across the spectrum of time zones, politically and economically, the majority of tax havens are intimately linked to major the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states. Therefore the term 'offshore' is strictly a political statement about the nexus between the state and part of its related territories (Palan, 1999 The fourth strand has a double perspective. On the one hand, there is a substantial bulk of literature on the measurement of capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2001 , 2008 which has provided updated accounts on a better calibration of the phenomenon. On the other hand, many scholars are consistent with the following policy orientation towards the fight against the phenomenon: attitudinal changes culminating in better governance through accountability and transparency (Ajayi, 1997) ; strong political will on the part of African and Western governments as well as effective cooperation for the repatriation of capital flight (Fofack & Ndkikumana, 2009) and; the position that much of Africa's accumulated debts may be deemed to be odious and their legitimacy challenged by governments and citizens of debtor nations (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2011) . The scope of this paper is broadly consistent with this third strand and complements it by providing a feasible timeframe for policy harmonization. The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined 10 respectively in Section 2. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a sample of 37 African countries with data from African Development 
Determination of fundamental characteristics
Consistent with mainstream literature, it is unlikely to find convergence within a heterogeneous set of countries (Asongu, 2013a) . Therefore, the determination of characteristics that are fundamental to capital flight is crucial. Government quality (transparency, corruption, regulation quality …etc) and macroeconomic fundamental characteristics have the limitation of varying over time. Hence, the same threshold may not be consistent over time, especially on a horizon of over 30 years. To categorize the countries, we borrow from Weeks (2012) who has based his analysis on three fundamental characteristics: exporters of petroleum, conflict-affected and others. While these categories may be somewhat exclusive, a consensus exists that 'conflict'
and 'an export sector dominated by petroleum' affect macroeconomic performance (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b) . However, difficulties arise in assigning countries to these categories in an exclusive and non-arbitrary manner.
Firstly, for the petroleum-exporting group, arbitrariness arises if a country qualifies for only a part of the time period, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in production. But this is not a major problem for the 37 countries in the dataset. Another objection to the classification might be that, some mineral producers (such as Botswana) have macroeconomic characteristics similar to petroleum exporters. We are consistent with Weeks (2012) in taking a "minimalist" approach, adhering strictly to the petroleum category and including only countries whose exports have been oil dominated for over a decade: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. Consistent with Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a) , the oil-rich countries account for 72 % of the total capital flight from the SSA sub-region ($ 591 billion). They postulate that the escalation of capital flight over the last decade has coincided with the steady increase in oil prices prior to the global economic crisis.
Secondly, the "conflict-affected" category presents analytical and practical difficulties. This is essentially because; few countries of the world are completely free from conflict.
Therefore distinctions must be made on the basis of degree. For the 37 countries over the years 1980-2010, few would object to the inclusion of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. We also include Ethiopia, whose internal conflict lasted throughout the 1980s, formally ending with Eritrean independence and a new government in Addis Ababa in 1991. In the years that followed, the ebb and flow of tensions between the two countries resulted in armed hostilities during the period 1998-2000. Despite the absence of some formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Zimbabwe due to the severity of its internal
strife. An important categorical objection is that, at least two of the petroleum countries also clearly quality as conflict-affected: Angola and Sudan. Contrary to Weeks (2012) Asongu (2013f) , globalization is a natural determinant of capital flight (human and physical). One of the most attractive mediums via which funds are siphoned is the channel of government or public spending (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b) . Capital flight increases with poor institutional quality and high levels of development assistance (Weeks, 2012) . From intuition, investors would naturally be motivated to divert capital abroad in situations of extremely high inflation. Higher economic prosperity that is not petroleum-oriented is associated with less capital flight because of higher expected returns on investment (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) .
14 Details about the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key variables used in this paper) and variable definitions (with corresponding data sources) are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3
respectively. The summary statistics of the variables show that there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues of overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated because two specifications are employed that incorporate only one aspect (variable) of highly correlated macroeconomic and institutional characteristics 9 . The fundamental characteristics are presented in Appendix 4.
Methodology
The estimation approach is based on β-convergence, consistent with the methodological underpinning motivating the study (Asongu, 2012) . Beside this justification, the alternative view of convergence (σ-convergence) which postulates that, a group of economies converges when the cross-section variance of the variable under consideration declines, is also inappropriate because the adaptation to the methodological innovation is for beta-convergence. Our estimation procedure typically follows the evidence of income convergence across countries which has been investigated in the context of pioneering works in neoclassical growth models (Baumol, 1986; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992 , 1995 Mankiw et al., 1992) , as well as in recent development literature (Narayan et al., 2011) .
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Consistent with the convergence literature (Fung, 2009, 3) , the two equations below are the standard approaches in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if t i W , is taken as strictly exogenous.
Y , is the measure of capital flight in country i at period t. τ refers to the order of non-overlapping intervals. (1) suggests that, countries relatively close to their steady state in 'capital flight growth' will experience a slowdown in the growth of capital flight, known as conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, 2) . In the same vein, according to Fung (2009, 3) 
However Eq. (3) presents another issue; estimation by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable and the disturbance term. To tackle this issue, we estimate the regression in differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Arellano & Bond (1991) suggested an application of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent variables and the error term. The procedure employs lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the levels equation, therefore exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent variables and the error term. Between the Difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and the System GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) , in a bid for robustness, we shall use both in the empirical analysis. However, in event of conflict of interest in the findings, those of the System GMM will be given priority; in line with Bond et al. (2001, 3-4) 10 .
The GMM estimation approach has been extensively applied in the convergence literature. In contrast to Narayan et al. (2011) , consistent with Asongu (2013c) we shall adopt Fung (2009) owing to software specificities 11 . In model specification, we choose the two-step GMM option because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity 12 . The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is crucial as lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variables. In addition, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the dependent variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant whereas their second-order auto-correlation should not be. The validity of the instruments is examined with the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test.
According to Islam (1995, 14) , yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time spans.
Therefore, considering the data span of 31 years, we use both two-year and three-year nonoverlapping intervals (NOI). This implies in the analysis, τ is set to 2 and 3 respectively. We also examine the incidence of short-term disturbances by setting τ to 1 under the hypothesis of
10 "We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) . The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research". Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) . 11 While Narayan et al. (2011) have used Eq. (1) in the absence of fixed effects, this paper applies Eqs. (2) and (3) instead; in line with Fung (2009) . The Fung (2009) approach has been used in recent African IPRs (Asongu, 2012) and financial development literature (Asongu, 2013a, b) . 12 In the one-step, the residuals are assumed to be homoscedastic.
'no intervals'. Accordingly, we compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating a/3, a/2, a/1 for the three-year, two-year and 'no intervals' datasets respectively. For example, with a/2, we divide the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable by 2 because we have used a two year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. When the absolute value of the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one ( 1 0   a ), we conclude the existence of convergence (in absolute or conditional terms). The broader interpretation suggests, past differences have less proportionate impact on future differences, denoting the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (3) is diminishing overtime as the country is converging to a steady state (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) .
To emphasize our point, the estimated lagged value of a standard dynamic GMM approach is a from which 1 is subtracted to obtain β (β= a-1). In this context the information criterion for beta-convergence is 0   . In the same vein, in order to limit the arithmetical gymnastics, a could be reported and the ' 1 0   a ' information criterion used to determine convergence. This interpretation is consistent with recent convergence literature (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23) .
Empirical Analysis
Presentation of results
This section investigates three principal concerns: (1) examination of the presence of convergence; (2) computation of the speed of convergence and; (3) determination of the time needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall results is presented in Table 6 where-in, the three issues are addressed. African baseline findings for absolute (unconditional) and conditional convergence are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. Robustness checks findings for absolute (conditional) convergence are presented in Table 3 (Tables 4-5 ).
Absolute convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of the endogenous variable as independent variable whereas; conditional convergence is with respect to Eqs. (2) and (3) statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected in all the regressions. We give priority to the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) test in first difference because it is more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. For almost all estimated models, we are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypotheses for the absence of autocorrelation, especially for conditional convergence specifications. Therefore, there is robust evidence that most of the models are deficient of autocorrelation at the 1% significance level. pa for full convergence time spans of 6.5 yrs and 6.05 yrs respectively. Accordingly, for the 2 yr NOI, to calculate the rates and corresponding years, with the initial value of 0.615, the rate of convergence is 30.75% pa ((0.615/2)*100) and the time needed to achieve full convergence is 6.5 yrs (200%/30.75%). Hence, 6.5 yrs is required to achieve a 100% convergence for an estimated lagged value of 0.615. 
Baseline regressions
Robustness checks
A summary of overall findings (baseline and robustness checks) from Tables 3-5 is presented in Table 6 . This includes results for AC, CC, the Speed of Absolute Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences. (Table 5) are substantially more significant than those based on the first specification (Table 4 ). This finding further confirms the empirical basis of the paper. Hence, conditional convergence is based on the variables we observe and empirically test (or model);
which may not reflect all determinants of capital flight that facilitate the convergence process.
Given the heterogeneous nature of the findings, our interpretations will be based on:
system GMM results, the second specification of conditional convergence and, the two-year NOI for the following reasons. Firstly, the edge of system GMM estimators over difference GMM estimators has already been outlined in the methodology section. Secondly, conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we model or empirically test and from our findings;
determinants of capital flight in the second specification better elucidate cross-country differences in institutional and macroeconomic characteristics than explain conditional convergence. Thirdly, the choice of the two-year NOI has four premises.
(1) 'Full data' is not used in mainstream literature because it is inherent of short-run disturbances. This position largely draws on the empirics of Islam (1995, 14) . (2) Most of the significant control variables have the right signs in both specifications. (1) Globalization in terms of trade openness, foreign direct investment and private capital flows increase capital flight (Asongu, 2013f) . (2) Public spending is one of the most attractive mediums through which funds are siphoned (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b) . Capital flight decreases with high levels of regulation quality and development assistance (Weeks, 2012) . The intuition that investors would be naturally motivated to divert capital abroad in economic situations of high inflation is confirmed by the positive sign of the inflation coefficient. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 7  7  7  23  23  23  9  10  10  19  19  19  28  28  28  Observations  138  73  50  200  146  98  95  120  83  167  125  82  243  181  119 ***, **,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. AR (2) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.10% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 15.73% Years to C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.5Yrs n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 19Yrs n.a n.a n.a n.a 11.25% 12.10% n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 10.50% Years to C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a 17.7Yrs 24.7Yrs n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 28.5Yrs 
Conditional Convergence with Specifications in
Discussion of results
Discussion and policy implications
Before we dive into the discussion of results, it is important at the outset to understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence of capital flight in the African continent. Absolute convergence in capital flight occurs when countries share similar fundamental characteristics with regard to bases governing capital flight such that, only variations across countries in initial levels of capital flight exist. Absolute convergence therefore results from factors such as the significant export of petroleum and national instability owing to conflicts. Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common to petroleum or conflict-affected countries. Hence, based on the intuition we expect capital flight to be higher in petroleum and conflict-affected countries. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for speedy convergence because of disparities in initial conditions of capital flight. These differences in initial conditions depend on: (1) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions and; (2) spontaneous reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of peace accords.
On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on cross-country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. Consistent with the economic growth literature (Barro, 1991) , conditional convergence depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one's own long-term steady state (equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and fundamentals of its economy in general and its institutions in particular. For instance, non-petroleum exporting countries may differ substantially in the level of globalization, institutional quality, financial development, economic prosperity, price stability, foreign aid…etc
To this end, our model for conditional convergence is contingent on globalization (trade, FDI and private capital flows), institutional quality (rule of law and regulation quality), financial development (at overall economic and financial system levels), economic prosperity (GDP growth at macro and micro levels), inflation and development assistance (total NODA and NODA from DAC countries). Owing to constraints in degrees of freedom, some models have not been conditional on all the determinants of capital flight outlined above. This is not a major issue because some conditional specifications in mainstream literature are not beyond two macroeconomic control variables (Bruno et al., 2012) .
We have observed the following from the findings. with lower rates of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates, both in absolute and conditional terms. Within the framework of the intuition motivating this analysis on benchmarking policy harmonization, two inferences could be made: on the one hand, convergence implies that, adopting common policies against the scourge is feasible and; full (100%) convergence within the specified time horizon reflects the implementation (or harmonization) of the feasible policies without distinction of nationality or locality.
Towards harmonizing policies on African capital flight
The African Union (AU) is already putting some efforts towards stemming the tide of capital flight (Christensen, 2009 ) and some sources of the AU have accused multinational companies of promoting capital flight from the continent. We have observed from the analysis that a standard-setting framework is feasible on the horizon of between 6 to 13 years. The following four points are relevant issues that need to be resolved to facilitate this harmonization:
improvement of the investment climate and ease of doing business to deter capital fight based on prospects of higher returns; formulation of common policies that would culminate in the repatriation of corruption-related capital flight deposited in Western banks and the improvement of formal institutions that will oversee the recuperation for this stolen capital (as well as deter potentially corrupt officials); involvement of Western banks in particular and the international community in general and; challenging the legitimacy of part of African debts.
Firstly, African governments need to make it easier to do business in their countries. In fact, excessive and unhelpful regulation put off local and foreign investors all over Africa.
Hence, growth and development are held back by governments that lack interest and capacity to foster private sector growth (which brings jobs, improvements to currency flows and tax revenues Bank, 2007) . This is due to relatively higher transactions costs which make it hard to attract legitimate assets held abroad by Africans. Hence, within the specified horizon of 6-13 years outlined above, the strategy for repatriating acquired assets should be an integral part of the national agenda for promoting both domestic and foreign investments.
Secondly, another focus of policy in the period leading to full convergence will be the improvement of governance in African countries. Governments should work towards demonstrating to asset holders that, repatriated assets will not be subject to distortionary treatment (taxation) or risk of embezzlement by corrupt leaders. Within this perspective, commitment to transparency by the African leadership will be critical in convincing private asset holders to repatriate their wealth back to the continent. Accordingly, a critical ingredient in the success of these strategies is strong political will both at the level of African governments and at the international level to enforce transparency in banking and capital account transactions.
Ultimately, African countries will have little chance of uncovering and repatriating stolen funds without the support and cooperation of their Western counterparts. In essence, repatriation of capital flight should figure prominently on the agenda for mobilizing domestic resources and boosting international support to accelerate the common initiatives. Recovery need to be supported and given adequate material, human and political resources to promote transparency in international financial institutions (Fofack & Ndikumana, 2009 ).
Regulatory mechanisms should include the following: sanctions to both African smugglers and their bankers; disclosure of the identity of holders of large balances to the authorities of both the country-of-incorporation of the bank and the country-of-origin of the asset holders; including of transparency related to stolen assets in the corporate ratings of Western banks to deter them from colluding in acts of financial crime; among others.
Fourthly, on challenging the legitimacy of part of African external debt, the following points could be raised: past borrowing practices failed the test of benefiting the people; the debts were often borrowed in the name of the people without their consent and, historical evidence can readily establish the test of creditor awareness (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2011) . This point is consistent with the thesis that, the burden of proof of legitimacy of past debts must rest on the lenders and that enforcing the doctrine of odious debt will result in a win-win situation for borrowers and lenders. Prior to full convergence, as Africa searches for ways to recuperate stolen funds and mitigate capital flight, we believe that the strategies outlined above for addressing the issues must feature prominently in debates at the national and international development assistance community levels; with the AU playing the leading role.
Caveats
Three main caveats have been retained: the absence of a sound theoretical basis, draw-backs in the methodology and failure to distinguish various capital flight components.
Firstly, using econometrics to accomplish more than just testing theory is not without downsides. The intuition basis of the work implies, results should be interpreted with caution as the model is conditioned on the variables we choose and empirically test, which may not directly reflect all macroeconomic and institutional conditions on which 'capital flight convergence' is endogenous.
Secondly, the choice of the convergence approach justified by the empirical underpinnings of Asongu (2012) also has its draw-backs. Accordingly, we would have loved to compute the corresponding sigma-convergence coefficients but we have stopped short of doing so because we are unaware of how to compute the rates of and time to full convergence for the approach. It should be noted that, we are adapting to a methodological innovation in the estimation of beta-convergence. Consistent with Apergis et al. (2010) , critics of β-convergence dispute that, if countries converge to a common equilibrium with identical internal structures, then the dispersion of the variable under consideration should disappear in the long-run as all countries converge to the same long-run path. If on the other hand, states converge to 'convergence clubs' or to their own unique equilibrium, the dispersion of this measure will not approach zero (Miller & Upadhyay, 2002) . Moreover, in the latter case of country-specific equilibrium, the movements of the dispersion will be contingent on the initial distribution of the variable under investigation with regard to their final long-run outcomes. Unfortunately, it is not 36 feasible to avoid disparities in initial conditions within fundamental characteristics for reasons already discussed. These differences in initial conditions depend on: (1) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions and; (2) spontaneous reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of peace accords. The econometric results are heterogenous as statistical convergence of capital flight is not found in all the regressions for two main reasons.
(1) Conditional convergence is relative, so it is normal for the results to vary with changes in the conditioning information set. (2) From an empirical standpoint, it is not unexpected to see some differences in the System GMM in comparison to the Difference GMM estimations because the former is based on some insufficiencies in the latter.
Thirdly, we have not distinguished 'bad capital flight' (i.e. illegally acquired funds, especially from African leaders and their "private acolytes") from "good capital flight", i.e.
funds legally transferred by households and firms. Hence even in the presence of full convergence, policies may not be adopted without distinction of nationality and locality because:
(1) capital moving from one country to another may be of different types across source countries and; (2) they may move for different reasons. Moreover, an opposite thesis might be advanced because while convergence facilitates understanding the depth of the capital flight problem, it is not the only condition for the adoption of policies because national specific reasons may be advocated to stem the tide.
Conclusion
With earthshaking and heartbreaking trends in African capital flight provided by a new database, this paper has complemented existing literature by adapting an existing methodology to answer some key policy questions on the feasibility of and timeframe for policy harmonization in the battle against the economic scourge. Three main findings have been established. (1) African countries with low capital flight rates are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates, implying the feasibility of policy harmonization towards fighting capital flight. (2) Petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected countries significantly play out in absolute and conditional convergences respectively. (3) Regardless of fundamental characteristics, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is within a horizon of 6 to 13 years. In other words, full (100%) convergence within the specified horizon is an indication that policies and regulations can be enforced without distinction of nationality or locality. Policy making strategies prior to harmonization have been discussed. 
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